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The Emergency Room Admission: How
Far Does the "Open Door" Go?
KENNETH R. WING*
JOHN R. CAMPBELLt
News item: February 4, 1985-San Francisco. A 34 year old man
with a wound from a knife which penetrated his skull was denied
emergency neurosurgery at a private hospital. Though the hospital
began treatment in the emergency room, the uninsured patient was
refused further care. Following transfer to another facility the pa-
tient died.'
This may have been an isolated incident. Certainly it was
unique or tragic enough to gain national media exposure, indicating
that the public should find the circumstances uncommon and dra-
matic. Some legal commentators, however, have proposed that sim-
ilar incidents are all too common, and that the law controlling
hospital emergency room care is sometimes ignored or misinter-
preted to the patient's harm. 2 While the law governing initial access
to emergency room services has been documented reasonably well,'
the incident above poses a narrower issue of increasing importance:
what is the extent of a private hospital's legal obligation to treat a
patient once emergency care has begun? The case law suggests that
there are at least two situations in which the private hospital may be
liable for denying extensive treatment to the emergency patient.
First, when the patient cannot be transferred without unreasonable
* Associate Professor, University of North Carolina, School of Law and
School of Public Health; B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1968; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1971; M.P.H., Harvard School of Public Health, 1972.
t Associate of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, & O'Neil,
Tampa, Florida; B.H.S., Duke University School of Medicine, 1981;J.D., University
of North Carolina School of Law, 1986.
1. CBS Evening News (Feb. 5, 1985); ABC Evening News, (Feb. 6, 1985). The
patient was an uninsured black man. Though the hospital had neurosurgical facili-
ties, a decision was made to transfer the patient. Two other hospitals refused to
take him, apparently prolonging the delay. Medical and legal commentators re-
cently cited similar incidents, however, none has received such national attention.
See, e.g., Dowell, infra note 2; Fine, infra note 3; Friedman, infra note 17.
2. See Dowell, Indigent Access to Hospital Emergency Room Services, 18 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 483-84 (1984). Dowell cites a number of reports of patients being de-
nied emergency care, and notes that "numerous patients continue to be turned
away from hospital emergency rooms because of confusion about the specific re-
quirements under relevant laws and the lack of enforcement of these laws." Id. at
484.
3. See, e.g., Fine, Opening the Closed Doors: The Duty of Hospitals to Treat Emergency
Patients, 24 WASH. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 123 (1983); Powers, Hospital Emergency
Service and the Open Door, 66 MicH. L. REV. 1455 (1968).
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risk of injury, and second, when the hospital has unique or special-
ized capabilities which the emergency condition requires.
I. HOSPITAL REVOLUTIONS: THE PROPRIETARY INSTITUTION AND
THE EMERGENCY ROOM
"[T]he modem hospital is a revolutionary institution," wrote
Professor Powers over fifteen years ago.4 If that was true in 1968,
then the 1980's launched a new offensive. Although the hospital
industry has been traditionally dominated by charitable and public
institutions,5 proprietary hospitals have aggressively and rapidly
captured a large share of the hospital market.6 In addition, proprie-
tary business techniques and marketing practices have become the
trend in institutional health care for proprietary hospitals and, re-
sponding to competitive pressures, for nonprofit and some public
hospitals.7 Such hospitals credit their success to cost cutting meas-
ures such as centralized billing and economies of scale.8 However,
they have been criticized for "industrializing" health care and focus-
ing on profit at the expense of health services. 9
Parallelling this proprietary revolution is the demise of the
traditional role of the hospital emergency room. Initially a lowly
"accident room," the public now considers the emergency room as
a neighborhood health center, and expects it to provide around-the-
clock primary care and emergency care with equal skill and speed. 0
This may be explained in part by the loss of general practitioners to
specialty medicine and the disappearance of the house call from
American health care, though other factors have been cited."t How-
ever, the change in public expectations resulted in a staggering in-
crease in emergency room visits since 1954. From only nine million
visits in 1954, emergency rooms were expected to see 160 million
patients in 1984,12 eighty to ninety-five percent of which were not in
"critical need of care." 3 This exponential growth has certainly bur-
4. Powers, supra note 3, at 1455.
5. In 1983, there were 5,783 community hospitals in the United States; 3,347
were non-profit, 757 were proprietary, 1679 were governmental (public). AMERI-
CAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS 6 (1984).
6. Medicine, TIME, Dec. 10, 1984, at 84. Proprietary institutions such as
Humana and Hospital Corporation of America have gathered a 20% share of the
market, double the market share of only five years ago.
7. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 428-44
(1982).
8. TIME, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 3, at 1476; TIME, supra note 6, at 85; Relman,
Economic Considerations in Emergency Care, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 372 (1985).
10. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, EMERGENCY CARE AND THE LAW 43 (1981).
11. Id. For a more complete discussion of the forces that impact upon the pub-
lic's concept of the emergency room and its use, see Fine, supra note 3, at 123 n.2.
12. M. MANCINI & A. GALE, supra note 10, at 43.
13. 1. SNOOK, HOSPITALS: WHAT THEY ARE AND How THEY WORK 59 (1981).
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dened emergency room resources, but conversely, hospitals have
found that from sixteen to thirty percent of admissions come from
the emergency department, making the "accident room" a potential
source of both profit and goodwill in the community.'
4
Medical and legal writers have suggested that proprietary hos-
pital practices in the emergency room may collide with the civil
law.' 5 Some writers have charged that many hospitals with emer-
gency services are limiting the care that they provide to uninsured
emergency patients by refusing emergency service16 or making pre-
mature patient transfers from the emergency room.1 7 Other com-
mentators add that such proprietary "cost cutting" practices are not
infrequently endangering patients. These writers forecast an inevi-
table increase of injuries and civil litigation.' 8 Proprietary institu-
tions also suffer criticism for cutting traditional hospital charity
services to indigents and low income patients." While these latter
allegations pose no question of liability under the common law,
20
they are at least creating a major public policy problem and may also
be contributing to a financial crisis for hospitals that provide serv-
ices to the poor.2' These hospitals, confronted with cuts in govern-
ment support, strong competition for the paying patient, and recent
closings of public and charitable institutions,22 may be forced to cut
services to the poor in order to survive, thus effectively rationing
health care.23
In response, some proprietary institutions such as Humana ac-
14. Id. at 52, 55.
15. See, e.g., Relman, supra note 9, at 372; Frank, Dumping the Poor: Private Hospi-
tals Risk Suits, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1985, at 25.
16. See, e.g., Himmelstein, Woolhandler, Harnley, Bader, Sibler, Backer &
Jones, Patient Transfers: Medical Practice as Social Triage, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 494
(1984). The authors did a retrospective study of 458 consecutive transfers from 14
private hospitals to a public hospital in Alameda, California. Using criteria to es-
tablish patients at high risk during transfer, they found 103 patients meeting this
profile. Of these patients, 33 were found to have received substandard care result-
ing from the transfer. See also Friedman, The "Dumping" Dilemma: Finding What's
Fair, HosPrrALS, Sept. 1982, at 75.
17. See, e.g., Dowell, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18. Frank, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., Dallek, For-Profit Hospitals and the Poor, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 860
(1983). Dallek notes industry spokesmen do not deny some of these charges, quot-
ing an American Medical Center spokesman: "We support indigent care through
the payment of our taxes." Id. at 862. See also Dallek, The Continuing Plight of Public
Hospitals, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97 (1982).
20. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Dallek, The Continuing Plight of Public Hospitals, supra note 19.
22. Id.
23. See Feder, Hadley & Mullner, Poor People and Poor Hospitals: Implications for
Public Policy, 9 J. HEALTH POL. & POL'y L. 237 (1984). The authors note that "[a
hospital's] chronic deficits bring chronic pressure: to cut back services, reduce
quality, or give up marginal activities-which may include some care to the poor.
In 1980 almost 20 percent of providers with high proportions of care to the poor
19851
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knowledge a responsibility to begin treating all emergencies. How-
ever, they vigorously defend their right to refuse to treat non-
emergency charity patients and to transfer "stabilized" emergency
patients to tax supported institutions if they cannot afford further
care.
2 4
Such statements somewhat beg the underlying legal and polit-
ical questions. Clearly, some transfers can be made safely, while
others risk creating liability; but there is a vast grey area in the law
involving the interpretation of the traditional legal concepts of
"duty" and "standard of care" within which predictions of liability
cannot be easily made. In addition, if transfer policies do in fact
create a burden on public or charitable hospitals, access for the
transfer patient may become restricted, either through hospital clos-
ings or refusals to accept transfer patients. If so, proprietary hospi-
tal practices effectively "kill the golden goose." As other hospitals
become reluctant to accept transfers, the risk of liability to the trans-
ferring institution can only increase. In short, while much will de-
pend on the specific facts and the jurisdiction, the law may require a
private institution to fully treat an emergency patient when no trans-
fer is possible or when transfer may result in serious detriment to
the patient.
II. THE EMERGENCY ROOM
The modem hospital emergency room is a separate and distinct
department, often so well staffed and equipped it resembles a "min-
iature hospital."' 25 Patients arrive at an admitting desk, if time per-
mits, or may go straight to "triage," where the patient is evaluated
by a nurse or M.D. and directed to the appropriate emergency room
physician. 26 Once a patient has been seen by a physician, the pa-
tient may be referred, treated and released, transferred, taken to
emergency surgery, or admitted. 21 In most hospitals, only a physi-
cian with admitting privileges for the institution can formally admit
a patient. The trend is for the emergency room to be staffed by full
time salaried physicians, but there are many variations on physician
staffing, ranging from compulsory or voluntary rotation of the hos-
pital's medical staff to contract arrangements with independent
emergency physician groups. 28 In fact, few emergency room physi-
cians have admitting privileges. Generally, the emergency room
physician determines whether admission is required, and then seeks
reported adoption of explicit limits on care to charity patients for financial rea-
sons." Id. at 248.
24. Dallek, For-Profit Hospitals and the Poor, supra note 19, at 862.
25. I. SNOOK, supra note 13, at 52.
26. SeeJ. GEORGE, LAW AND EMERGENCY CARE 66-70 (1980).
27. I. SNOOK, supra note 13, at 52-53.
28. Id. at 53-54.
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admission for the patient through the appropriate staff physician
who is usually "on call" for admissions to his or her specialty of
care.29 Each hospital's policies and regulations, whether individual-
ized or based on national standards such as those of the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals, frequently clarify how these
matters are handled for that particular institution.3 0 Written hospi-
tal policies can be extremely important as evidence of "duty" or
"standard of conduct" in malpractice suits.3 ' Notwithstanding, such
measures of liability will be made ultimately by the courts and not by
the individual institution or professional associations.
III. THE EMERGENCY: WHAT IS THE STANDARD?
The liability of a hospital for limiting or withholding emergency
care may often turn on a judicial definition of "emergency," as the
case law below will demonstrate. However, courts have virtually re-
fused to provide an explicit definition of the term. Instead, courts
generally let a jury find whether an emergency existed based on ex-
pert testimony and the facts of each case. Therefore, providers
making emergency treatment and transfer decisions may be subject
to the diverse definitions of "emergency" in the medical commu-
nity, and, ultimately, to the interpretation of these definitions by a
jury in malpractice litigation.32
The definition of "emergency" could be quite broad. One
writer recently suggested that some medical clinicians might define
emergency care as "that care which if not given will result in death
within 24 hours."3 3 Other commentators have supported a much
broader definition.3 4 Some courts addressing the emergency trans-
fer issue have adopted the broader view in practice, finding that
non-fatal frostbite,3 5 burn,36 or arterial37 injuries could be "emer-
29. SeeJ. GEORGE, supra note 26, at 79.
30. See A. SoUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRA-
nON 194 (1978).
31. Id. See also Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1978), where the court
noted "we find it unnecessary to evaluate the evidence in light of one of these [com-
mon-law] standards, since the evidence of the hospital's breach of its own standards
is sufficient to create a jury issue." Id. at 12.
32. The Supreme Court of Arizona has said that "[w]hat constitutes an emer-
gency is a matter of some disagreement. There are various definitions; the need for
immediate attention seems to be the common thread. Ordinarily it is for the jury to
determine the factual question of the duration of an emergency and the treatment
modalities that are a necessary component of emergency care." Thompson v. Sun
City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 603, 688 P.2d 605, 611 (1984).
33. Frank, supra note 15, at 25.
34. Dowell, supra note 2, at 484-85.
35. Stanturfv. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
36. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
37. Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 603, 688
P.2d 605, 611 (1984).
1985]
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gencies." The Mississippi Supreme Court implicitly defined emer-
gency in broader terms by holding that emergency treatment is that
which is "immediately and reasonably necessary for the preservation
of the life, limb or health of the patient."3 8 Medical organizations
have provided their own definitions of the term, which tend to be
quite broad. For instance, the American Hospital Association has
defined a true emergency as "any condition clinically determined to re-
quire immediate medical care. Such conditions range from those re-
quiring extensive immediate care and admission to the hospital to
those that are diagnostic problems and may or may not require ad-
mission after work-up and observation."39  Other organizations
have developed even broader definitions.4"
Clearly, some courts and some national organizations (includ-
ing their member hospitals and physicians) have developed an ex-
pansive definition of what constitutes an "emergency." In
malpractice actions, where the existence of an emergency is relevant
to a provider's liability, the majority of courts may allow the jury to
consider a similar range of evidence on the meaning of the term. It
38. New Biloxi Hosp. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 197, 146 So. 2d 882, 887
(1962).
39. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, EMERGENCY SERVICES vii (1972).
40. The American College of Emergency Physicians has defined emergency
care in this way:
A medical emergency includes:
1. any condition resulting in admission of the patient to a hospital or
nursing home within 24 hours;
2. evaluation or repair of acute (less than 72 hours) trauma;
3. relief of acute or severe pain;
4. investigation or relief of acute infection;
5. protection of public health;
6. obstetrical crises and/or labor;
7. hemorrhage or threat of hemorrhage;
8. shock or impending shock;
9. investigation and management of suspected abuse or neglect of a
person which, if not interrupted, could result in temporary or permanent
physical or psychological harm;
10. congenital defects or abnormalities in a newborn infant, best man-
aged by prompt intervention;
11. decompensation or threat of decompensation of vital functions, such
as sensorium, respiration, circulation, excretion, mobility or sensory
organs;
12. management of a patient suspected to be suffering from a mental
illness and posing an apparent danger to the safety of himself, herself or
others;
13. any sudden and/or serious symptom(s) which might indicate a condi-
tion which constitutes a threat to the patient's physical or psychological
well-being requiring immediate medical attention to prevent possible de-
terioration, disability or death.
American College of Emergency Physicians, Definition of Emergency Medicine, 10 AN-
NALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 385, 385-88 (1981) (as cited in Dowell, supra note 2, at
484).
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follows that a prospective definition is inherently speculative. A
hospital using less than an expansive definition of "emergency" to
determine emergency treatment and transfer policies may be expos-
ing itself to a substantial risk of liability.
IV. THE COMMON LAW AND THE "No DUTY" RULE
The case law and legal principles that address a hospital's obli-
gation to continue emergency treatment were largely developed to
address a separate and more primary question: does the private
hospital have any legal obligation to treat emergency patients who
come to the emergency room?
Literally read, the common-law4 ' answer may be shocking to
the lay public: in at least some American jurisdictions, a hospital
may be able to refuse emergency treatment to a patient.42 Com-
mentators have characterized this rule as the older and poorer
view,4" however, and have warned that when applied to emergency
41. The discussion in this artide is focused entirely on the common-law obliga-
tions of private hospitals. Hospitals, both private and public, may also have obliga-
tions to accept patients arising from federal or state legislative mandates.
Hospitals that have received Hill-Burton funds (or funds under the 1974 health
planning legislation) must provide both a reasonable volume of uncompensated
services and a community service. For a discussion of these two distinct obliga-
tions, see Wing, The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Health Facilities, 23
B.C.L. REV. 577 (1982).
Various federal and state laws also prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, creed, color, handicap, and age in the provision of hospital services
(although these laws have been rarely interpreted with regard to hospital services).
For background on one such legislative scheme, see Wing, Title VI and Health Facili-
ties: Forms Without Substance, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 137 (1978).
It is also possible, although rarely applied or enforced, that non-profit hospi-
tals might have either a "free care" or a "community service" obligation arising out
of their exemption from federal or state taxes. For interpretations of a non-profit
hospital's obligations under its federal income tax exemption, see Rev. Rul. 69-545,
1969-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-42 C.B. 94.
42. Powers noted in 1968 that "[w]e begin with the shocking proposition that
present law in most American jurisdictions is said to permit a hospital to keep its
doors closed to the person seeking emergency medical aid." Powers, supra note 3,
at 1460. The most recent article to address the emergency care issue presents a
state by state analysis of relevant common-law cases and applicable statutes.
Though the modern trend is apparently to require a hospital to provide treatment
to those emergencies which present at the emergency room, a majority ofjurisdic-
tions that have not yet addressed the issue may still permit a private hospital to
refuse to provide such treatment, at least in theory. See Dowell, supra note 2, at 494-
99.
43. Addressing the traditional view, Powers stated "[it may be that] the amaz-
ing potency of the dictum in Crews [the seminal common-law case] has evapo-
rated.... The common law regurgitates what it cannot digest." Powers, supra note
3, at 1468. Southwick notes that "a hospital need not, by application of the early
common law, employ its facilities and staff to aid the person who presents himself
for treatment. Recent court cases and some statutes, however, suggest that this
attitude has changed, at least with respect to hospitals which maintain emergency
1985l
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treatment, the common law rarely does what the common law says.
In almost every jurisdiction, courts have circumvented the rule and
found some way to hold hospitals or emergency room physicians
liable for negligently refusing or providing emergency treatment.
44
The situation is complex, but it can be explained, if not justi-
fied. One longstanding principle of tort law is that a person is not
legally obligated to help another person in distress. 4 5 There are a
number of exceptions to this rule, but no exception mandates a phy-
sician to aid someone who is not already his patient. Thus a physi-
cian can refuse to aid the dying child who comes to his office, or the
accident victim he encounters on the street; there is no duty to
render such aid.46 From this common-law "no duty to treat" rule
evolved Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews,47 and the often quoted
1934 holding that a private hospital owes no duty to accept an emer-
gency patient not desired by it.48 However, in almost every Ameri-
can jurisdiction to consider the issue, either the Crews doctrine has
been rejected,49 or another principle of law was found controlling.50
Some modern courts, expressly rejecting Crews, have held that a pri-
vate hospital with an emergency room has a legal duty to at least
examine every emergency patient that appears at the door.5'
care facilities. The public expects aid, and sound moral doctrine dictates that hos-
pitals extend aid which they are capable of rendering." A. SoUTHwic, supra note
30, at 186.
44. Analyzing these cases in detail is beyond the scope of this article. For an in
depth treatment of the issue, see generally Fine, supra note 3; Powers supra note 3.
Southwick concludes that:
[als these cases demonstrate, in summary, patients who present them-
selves at the hospital emergency room should never be turned away until
they have been seen and examined by a licensed physician, who thus de-
termines the seriousness of the illness or injury and then orders admis-
sion, return home, or referral to another facility, depending on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 30, at 194.
45. For a discussion of the common-law origins of the "no duty" rule, see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c (1965).
46. See, e.g., Childs v. Weiss, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (leading
case holding that a physician is under no duty to provide emergency services to all
who request such care).
47. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
48. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
the Crews case.
49. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135
(1961); Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
50. See, e.g., Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1978); Citizens Hosp.
Ass'n v. Schoulin, 48 Ala. App. 101, 262 So. 2d 303 (1972); Lejune Rd. Hosp., Inc.
v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
51. See, e.g., Mercy Medical Center, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260,
206 N.W.2d 198 (1973); Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d
1329 (1975); Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
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Thus, at least in the emergency room setting, most courts have
treated hospital and hospital-based physicians differently than pri-
vate physicians by circumventing the traditional "no duty" rule.
The reasons are probably based on a traditional view of hospitals as
institutions of charity and compassion-institutions with a "moral
duty" to treat emergencies. An explanation that also addresses the
foundation of the "no duty" rule was neatly stated by Professor
Powers: "the emergency room is vital to the community; it cannot
be characterized as the locus of a chance encounter. A rule which
evolved in the context of independent medical practitioners . . .
should not be applied to hospitals automatically and without
consideration."
52
An understanding of the common law on this issue is compli-
cated by the fact that over half the states have not addressed the
point in case law or by legislation.5" Presumably, in these states,
even a court following traditional common-law principles could
choose to follow the "no duty" rule, recognize an affirmative duty to
treat, or hedge (the majority) and find an effective duty to treat
under various exceptions to the "no duty" rule. Though a modern
court could follow the Crews "no duty" rule, the weight of the prece-
dent and modem opinion argues against it. A practical reading of
the case law, contradictions and complexities admitted, is that a hos-
pital must treat or arrange treatment for all emergency patients that
appear at the emergency room, or run a palpable risk of liability.
54
In addition, many hospitals are subject to a variety of state and fed-
eral statutory requirements that essentially require that initial emer-
gency treatment be provided.5" Moreover, by imposing this
obligation on the hospital emergency room, the law may have
opened a door that cannot easily be closed.
V. THE OPEN DOOR: WHERE DOES rr STOP?
There are few cases that directly address the extent of a hospi-
tal's duty to the undesirable (e.g., uninsured or Medicaid eligible)
emergency patient following initial examination or treatment. In
the past, many hospitals have, as a practical matter, probably fol-
lowed a policy of stabilizing and transferring undesirable patients,
while treating or even admitting the undesirable emergencies which
would worsen during transfer. That may explain why relatively few
interpretations of relevant legal principles have developed. How-
ever, if some observers are correct, emergency patients are now be-
ing transferred from hospitals having more proprietary-type
52. Powers, supra note 3, at 1477.
53. See Dowell, supra note 2, at 494-99.
54. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. Seesupra note 41.
1985]
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practices with alarming frequency, 56 and some researchers charge
that many of these patients may be "at risk" of deteriorating during
transfer.57 If accurate, these claims suggest that unless hospitals
making emergency transfers have some "immunity" from liability,
courts will soon be forced to apply these critical principles with in-
creased frequency.
The relevant case law, though neither consistent in theory nor
always well reasoned, clearly provides no "immunity" to the trans-
ferring institution in these cases. On the contrary, the overwhelm-
ing majority of decisions have essentially allowed a jury to decide
whether the hospital was responsible for injury-related emergency
transfers.5 Unfortunately, the inconsistency of the reasoning be-
hind these decisions makes either descriptive or predictive summary
of the underlying principles difficult. Nonetheless, the few cases on
point and the larger body of law on the similar "duty to begin treat-
ment" issue provide some guidelines.
A. Duty to Continue Emergency Care
In a common-law negligence action, whether against a hospital
or a physician, a plaintiff cannot recover without satisfying the four
elements of duty, breach of the standard of conduct, causation, and
injury.5" The legal recognition of "duty" and the definition of the
standard of conduct imposed by that duty are pivotal to an under-
standing of any obligation to continue emergency care.
In the common law, "duty" is defined as "an obligation.., to
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another."6 As
noted earlier, the seminal Crews decision held that a private hospital
had no duty to accept any patient it did not desire.6 In Crews, a two
year old girl with diptheria, though responding to antitoxin and oxy-
gen treatment in the emergency room, was refused further treat-
ment and sent home; she subsequently died within the hour. The
court said the hospital was clearly within its rights, indicating that
there was no duty to treat the patient.62 The Crews court rejected an
argument that the hospital had incurred a duty to treat the patient
by beginning treatment. This latter concept, the common-law the-
56. Dowell reports a 500% increase in transfers from private hospitals to Chi-
cago's Cook County General Hospital during 1982 and 1983. Dowell, supra note 2,
at 483. Other reports note an increase in transfers to public hospitals of 200 to
375% in some cities over the last few years. Frank, supra note 15, at 25.
57. See Himmelstein, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., supra notes 32, 44, 49-51 and accompanying text, and infra notes
79, 83, 92, 96, 106, 111, 117 and accompanying text.
59. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971). See also M. MANCINI
& A. GALE, supra note 10, at 15-23.
60. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 324.
61. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
62. 229 Ala. 398, 399-400, 157 So. 224, 225.
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ory of "gratuitous undertaking," traditionally states that, although
there may be no duty to aid another, one may be liable for negli-
gently giving or discontinuing aid if the risk of harm is increased as a
result or if the other is harmed by relying on the aid.63 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court found that the hospital "undertook" emer-
gency treatment, but had not affirmatively increased the risk of harm
from the child's illness, and therefore was not liable for her death.
The reliance issue was not addressed. 64
A majority of courts have agreed with the initial "no duty to
begin treatment" rule established in the Crews decision.65 However,
virtually all courts have avoided this rule, finding that a minimal un-
dertaking may impose a duty of due care, 66 or that having the pa-
tient in the emergency room (without treating him) may make him
an "admitted patient" and therefore undertake a duty,67 or that a
hospital with an emergency room must treat all emergencies as a
matter of law.
68
Further, in addressing a duty to continue emergency care, most
modem courts have rejected the Crews contention that a hospital
could arbitrarily discharge an emergency patient before emergency or
necessary care was provided or arranged. As will be discussed be-
low, various courts have found that a hospital which undertakes to
treat but then transfers the patient may be liable for "increasing the
risk of harm," 69 or that a hospital cannot make a transfer to avoid
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
64. The Crews court went beyond the facts presented in that case to state the
applicable law. One commentator notes: "On the lack of duty to render emer-
gency treatment, the principle for which it has been so often cited, the Crews case
contains only dicta." Powers, supra note 3, at 1465-66. See also Fine, supra note 3, at
130-31. This is because the hospital in Crews had a valid policy barring admissions
of individuals with a contagious disease, which the child had. However, the dicta in
Crews is probably consistent with the traditional common law. See Powers, supra
note 3, at 1465. Further, though Crews is fifty years old, the Alabama Supreme
Court expressly reaffirmed the decision in 1976 in Harper v. Baptist Med. Center-
Princeton, 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976). Though both Crews and Harper could be
criticized for supporting the traditional common-law only in dicta, see, e.g., Fine,
supra note 3, at 128, the courts tend to view the common-law "no duty" rule as
binding precedent.
65. See supra notes 42, 43, 44 and accompanying text.
66. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475
(1961); see infra note 96 and accompanying text. There may be no practical differ-
ence between finding a hospital/patient relationship and finding a hospital's "un-
dertaking" as in O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436
(1960). Both approaches allow a jury to find a resultant duty of reasonable care.
However, the former approach has overtones of a contract relationship, which may
support a cause of action in abandonment. See generally 3 PROOF OF FACTS 2d 123
(1974); A. SoUTnwIcK, supra note 30, at 92-100.
68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., infra note 111 and accompanying text.
19851
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Det. L. Rev. 129 1985-1986
130 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:119
providing necessary emergency treatment, 70 or that a hospital must
provide all "medically indicated" emergency care.7'
In avoiding or rejecting the Crews court's interpretation of duty
on the continuing emergency treatment question, it appears that
courts have been struggling to avoid a problem with the "undertak-
ing" theory. Traditionally, this problem with the common-law the-
ory of gratuitous undertaking has been illustrated by a "drowning
man" hypothetical. Assume a man is drowning in a lake with no
hope of rescue. Must a passer-by who can easily throw a rope and
save the man's life do so? The common-law answer is theoretically
"no." This hypothetical illustrates the "no duty to aid" theory
noted earlier, as morally outrageous as it may appear.72
However, the concept of gratuitous undertaking arises when
the hypothetical is slightly varied. Assume that the passer-by under-
takes to save the drowning man and throws the rope. Will the law
obligate him to complete the effort, or may he arbitrarily abandon
the rescue? Under traditional common-law theory, unless the
drowning man's plight is worsened by the passer-by's action, or un-
less the drowning man relied to his detriment on the action (for ex-
ample, by foregoing other chances of rescue), the passer-by can
abandon the rescue without legal sanction. 7' The reasoning is that
the aborted rescue has not changed the drowning man's lot-he is
still a drowning man, no better, no worse-so the passer-by has not
increased the risk of harm. Further, there is no reliance to his detri-
ment if no chance of rescue was lost because of the passer-by's acts.
The emergency care issue resembles the "drowning man" hy-
pothetical. Crews illustrates this.7 ' However, other courts address-
ing the emergency care question have not applied the theory of
gratuitous undertaking with great deference to the traditional com-
mon-law formula. In fact, authorities have recognized a general
70. See, e.g., infra notes 96, 106 and accompanying text.
71. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
73. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 343-48.
74. One commentator noted:
Crews is an example of rendering aid and sending the patient away
with the mutual understanding that he is in no better condition than
before treatment. It is completely consistent with the general tort law with
respect to the duty to aid one in peril. The hospital provided aid and,
although its help conferred no particular benefit, it did not make the con-
dition worse.
Powers, supra note 3, at 1465. However, other commentators maintain that in Crews
"[tihe hospital provided some treatment, but it abandoned that care before the
patient's condition had stabilized. The imposition of liability would be fully consis-
tent with the exception to the general rule that one who undertakes to aid another
in peril must do so with reasonable care." Fine, supra note 3, at 127-28. Prosser
tends to support the latter interpretation of the undertaking law. See infra notes 75-
77 and accompanying text.
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trend toward changing the law of undertaking.75 Prosser, address-
ing the "drowning man" hypothetical, claimed the individual ren-
dering aid could not let go of the rope without good reason:
It seems very unlikely that any court will ever hold that one
who has begun to pull a drowning man out of the river af-
ter he has caught hold of the rope is free, without good
reason, to abandon the attempt, walk away and let him
drown, merely because he was already in extremis before
the effort has begun.
76
Prosser further stated that "[w]here performance clearly has been
begun, there is no doubt that there is a duty of care."'77 It appears
that most courts have agreed with Prosser's analysis, and have been
quite liberal both in finding what constitutes an "undertaking," and
in assessing the extent of the "duty" once an undertaking is
found.78 In the fifty years since Crews was decided, the law of gratui-
tous undertaking may have acquired a new significance in hospital
law, at least on the narrow issue of a duty to continue emergency
care.
One of the cases most often cited in the emergency care context
is O'Neill v. Monteflore Hospital.79 Plaintiff's decedent complained of
severe arm pains and became diaphoretic and pale. He walked to
the hospital emergency room and told the nurse he thought he was
having a heart attack. The hospital did not accept patients with his
particular insurance policy, and the nurse refused to begin treat-
ment. However, she did call a physician who worked with that insur-
ance plan. He instructed the decedent to go home until the
morning. After walking home, the decedent died of a heart attack.
The court found that it was for the jury to determine whether the
nurse undertook to provide medical attention by telephoning the
physician, and if so, whether that medical attention was inadequate.
A new trial was ordered to make that determination."
The O'Neill case illustrates the quantum of action that may cre-
ate a legal "undertaking." No pre-existing provider/patient rela-
tionship was found. Consequently, the hospital had no duty to
accept the decedent under a literal reading of the traditional com-
mon law. However, the court found that a de minimus act by the
nurse, making a phone call, could constitute an undertaking and im-
pose a duty of care.8' In O'Neill, such a duty was recognized and the
jury was left to decide the extent of this duty. This decision graphi-
75. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 346-47.
76. Id. at 348.
77. Id. at 346.
78. See, e.g., supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
79. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
80. Id. at 135-36, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
81. Id.
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cally shows how the "no duty to begin treatment" doctrine has been
undermined by the law of gratuitous undertaking. It also suggests
the practical implications of this judicial interpretation of this duty
since, as a practical matter, emergency rooms must evaluate emer-
gencies, and evaluation involves some degree of interaction with the
patient. In O'Neill and similar cases,8 2 any evaluation or attention
apparently will create a duty to use reasonable care.
In jerstad v. Knutson,8" plaintiff's decedent arrived at the emer-
gency room after becoming ill on a family trip. An intern examined
him, took a throat culture and blood test (but made no direct exami-
nation of the throat), and discharged him with a prescription for an
antibiotic. The intern was unable to locate a staff physician to ap-
prove the patient's discharge as required by hospital policy. The
next morning, the decedent's wife found him dead, asphyxsiated
from his swollen epiglottis blocking the trachea. In ordering a new
trial on the issue of the hospital's liability, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota interpreted the undertaking law as follows:
Although it has been held that a hospital, even one operat-
ing an emergency room, has no duty to accept a patient for
treatment... once [a hospital] undertakes to render medi-
cal aid, the hospital is required to do so non-negli-
gently .... The duty arose in this case, since the hospital
undertook, through its nurses and intern, to render treat-
ment to decedent. Decedent had a right to expect that the
treatment rendered by a hospital which maintains and staffs
an emergency room would be commensurate with that
available in the same or similar communities or in hospitals
generally.
84
The Fjerstad court easily found an undertaking, because the pa-
tient was diagnosed and treated during a lengthy stay at the emer-
gency room. However, in finding a duty, the court made no analysis
of the traditional undertaking law criteria noted earlier. Though it
presumably could have found the patient relied to his detriment on
the undertaking (by foregoing other care), the court instead stated a
blanket rule that in undertaking to treat an emergency, a hospital
incurs a duty which is measured by the community standard for sim-
ilar hospitals to treat the emergency patient. This is clearly a broad
departure from the traditional law of undertaking, but the Fjerstad
court has not been alone in adapting that law to fit the emergency
care situation. In fact, most of the cases addressing the undertaking
rule in the emergency room context would allow a jury to find liabil-
ity if a hospital "undertakes" to treat an emergency patient by its
82. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
83. 271 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1978).
84. Id. at 11-12.
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conduct, giving the jury wide latitude in interpreting the reasonable-
ness of the conduct.85 This standard of conduct and its implications
may impose more of a legal burden in the emergency transfer con-
text than many hospitals realize.
B. Reasonable Care under the Circumstance-the Standard of Conduct
In a medical context, the standard of conduct requires that a
provider be found negligent for failing to do what a reasonable pro-
vider would have done in similar circumstances-for not adhering
to "good medical practice."8 6 Under this standard of conduct, a
hospital can be liable for its acts alone, such as implementing negli-
gent hiring, admissions, or medical treatment policies.8 7 In addi-
tion, a hospital can be liable for the acts of a hospital physician or
hospital employee on separate legal grounds.8 8 Generally, the ques-
tion whether this standard of conduct has been breached is deter-
mined by the jury (based on expert testimony);89 thus, precise
definitions are elusive. However, the decisions in the emergency
care context at least indicate that the extent of a hospital's obliga-
tions may be quite broad.
Courts have taken two general approaches in determining the
standard of conduct for hospitals in rendering emergency treat-
ment. Some courts have avoided lengthy discussion of the underly-
ing legal principles or definitions such as "duty," "undertaking," or
the "standard of conduct," and instead have given the jury broad
discretion to find or reject liability on the facts.90 Other courts have
been more pedantic in formulating guidelines for a jury and future
85. See, e.g., supra notes 67, 79; infra notes 92, 96, 106, 111 and accompanying
text.
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 185-93.
87. See generally A. SoUmWIcK, supra note 30, at 409-23. This is a relatively new
theory of liability in hospital law termed "corporate negligence." Before the case
of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), a hospital owed only limited duties
directly to the patient. However, Darling found that a hospital as a separate entity
could be liable for the quality of medical treatment under some circumstances.
88. See generally M. MANCINI & A. GALE, supra note 10, at 25-38. Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, hospitals as employers can be liable for the wrong-
ful acts of their employees, even though the hospitars conduct is without fault. It
must be shown that a master-servant relationship existed and that the wrongful act
occurred within the scope of that relationship. This doctrine applies to physicians
who are employees of the hospital as well. However, hospitals may be liable in
some situations for the negligence of physicians who are independent contractors,
which is a common arrangement in the emergency room. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text. The doctrine of "ostensible agency" provides that a hospital
may be liable for the actions of an individual who is not an employee if the hospital
has cloaked an independent contractor with the indicia of apparent authority to act
in behalf of the hospital.
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 161-66, 206-07.
90. See infra notes 92, 106 and accompanying text.
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courts to use.91 In either approach, however, courts generally have
recognized that a hospital may have an extensive duty to continue
treating the undesirable emergency patient. An example of the for-
mer approach is Hunt v. Palm Springs General Hospital,92 where a hos-
pital refused to admit an emergency room seizure patient because of
an unpaid bill. Apparently, the patient had been without needed
medication for some time and began convulsing at home. At the
emergency room, he was given medication and discharged, but he
later returned and his physician asked if the patient could be admit-
ted. Because of the outstanding bill, the hospital refused to admit
him unless his condition was "critical," which the physician said it
was not. Thereafter, the patient was placed in a hallway where he
stayed for five hours unattended, his blood pressure and pulse ele-
vated, his body trembling. He was finally transferred to another
hospital, where he died of brain damage from prolonged seizures
within twenty-six hours. Expert testimony for the patient's estate
stated that the hospital's treatment fell below acceptable standards
of medical practice, and that these deficiencies were causually re-
lated to his death.
The court addressed the issues of "duty" and "standard of con-
duct," stating, "[i]f Palm Springs owed no duty to the decedent, its
negligence would be immaterial to this cause."93  However, the
court rejected the contention that the hospital had no duty to con-
tinue treating the patient. Instead, the court held that "the ques-
tions of whether [defendant] owed [the patient] a duty of care
despite his non-admitted status while he lay in its emergency room
area, and whether any breach of such duty occurred which was a
causative factor in [his] demise are for the jury to determine." '94
Hunt is not particularly enlightening for its analysis of the facts
or the common law.9 5 The standards that measure the hospital's
duty of care to an emergency patient are not articulated. On its
facts, however, the case is consistent with the same "undertaking"
and "reasonable care" approach to hospital liability as Fjerstad and
other cases below. The case does not expressly address the ques-
tion of whether the patient had to be admitted or treated in the
emergency room, or whether the hospital could have simply trans-
ferred him sooner. However, the court found that the hospital had
a duty to continue treating him and allowed a jury to hear evidence
on the issue of whether that duty had been breached.
91. See infra notes 96, 111 and accompanying text.
92. 352 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1977).
93. Id. at 584.
94. Id. at 585.
95. Id. at 583, 585. Whether "admitted" as opposed to "non-admitted" refers
to the emergency room or the hospital proper is left unclear. In addition, the court
makes no attempt to analyze the elements of liability on the facts.
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Unlike Hunt, other cases provide more helpful guidelines to de-
termine the extent of a hospital's duty. For example, the Mississippi
Supreme Court addressed the issue in New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v. Fra-
zier," in which a forty-two year old man, his brachial artery torn
away by a shotgun blast, was brought to the emergency room by
ambulance. Though he bled enough to soak the ambulance cot and
the floor with blood, his care was limited to having his vital signs
taken once. He was not bandaged. The physician on call did make
arrangements for transfer to the nearest veteran's hospital, but after
bleeding freely for two hours in the New Biloxi emergency room,
the patient died following the transfer. In affirming a verdict against
the hospital, the court first found that the man was a "patient,"
though he had not been treated. The court next outlined the hospi-
tal's duty to the patient:
In an emergency, the victim should be permitted to
leave the hospital only after he has been seen, examined
and offered reasonable first aid. In undertaking to do so, a
hospital must exercise due care. A hospital rendering
emergency treatment is obligated to do that which is imme-
diately and reasonably necessary for the preservation of the
life, limb or health of the patient. It should not discharge a
patient in a critical condition without furnishing or procur-
ing suitable medical attention.
97
Again, the undertaking issue is addressed without mention of
the strictures of the traditional common law. The New Biloxi court,
like the court in Fjerstad, applied a broad standard of conduct to the
treatment of emergency patients, whether or not the patient was de-
sired by the hospital. New Biloxi is unusual among the cases recog-
nizing that a duty of continuing care applies to emergency patients
because it expressly articulates the standard of conduct. In doing
so, the decision uses an expansive definition of emergency. How-
ever, New Biloxi is neither extreme nor unique. Other cases have
similarly recognized, either explicitly or by implication, that a duty
to continue emergency care may require a hospital to provide exten-
sive treatment to an undesirable patient if transfer would cause or
allow deterioration of the patient's condition.9"
C. The Emergency Transfer
Hospital spokesmen are correct in stating that they are within
their rights to stabilize emergency patients and transfer them to
other hospitals. 99 However, the transfer of an emergency patient, if
96. 245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962).
97. Id. at 197, 146 So. 2d at 887.
98. See infra notes 104, 106, 111, 117 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 19.
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done non-negligently, is lawful not because the hospital has "no
duty" or a "lesser duty" following initial emergency care, but be-
cause in transferring the patient it has acted as a reasonable pro-
vider and has not violated the applicable standard of conduct.
Legal commentators agree that a duty of care incurred by an
undertaking can be discharged if the conduct is reasonable. Prosser
has stated:
The defendant is never required to do more than is
reasonable; and he may terminate his responsibility by
turning an injured man over to a doctor or to his friends,
or where it is reasonable to do so he may discontinue his
performance and step out of the picture upon notice of his
intention and disclosure of what remains undone.' 0 0
It follows that a hospital may be able to discontinue perform-
ance and transfer an emergency patient when a duty is incurred
through an undertaking.' 0 a However, the majority of jurisdictions
suggest that the reasonableness of an emergency transfer decision
depends upon the patient's condition and is measured by the pre-
vailing standard of medical practice. No lesser standard controls,
and surely not a standard based upon the hospital's "convenience,"
or an administratively determined policy to accept or refuse certain
categories of patients. The Fjerstad court found that reasonable care
meant care "commensurate with that available in ... hospitals gen-
erally."' 02 In New Biloxi the court held that a hospital "should not
discharge a patient in a critical condition without furnishing or pro--
curing suitable medical attention."' ' These decisions and others
below suggest that reasonable treatment of a true emergency would
not allow a provider to "step out of the picture" without arranging
for or providing virtually any necessary medical treatment.
InJoyner v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation,'"4 a Louisiana Court
of Appeals addressed the "reasonableness" question when it held
that an emergency patient could not recover for pain and suffering
incurred in transfer after receiving initial emergency treatment.
The patient came to the emergency room with facial lacerations, a
possible head injury, and loss of blood. He was bandaged, x-rayed,
monitored for shock, and given I.V. fluids to stabilize his blood
pressure. After his blood pressure stabilized and a serious head in-
jury was ruled out, he was given pain medication. However, the
hospital refused to admit the patient in-house without a deposit on
his bill and transferred him. The patient later sued for injury and
100. W. PROSSER, supra note 59, at 348.
101. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
102. 271 N.W.2d at 11.
103. 245 Miss. at 103, 146 So. 2d at 887.
104. 230 So. 2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 1970)._
136
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pain and suffering incurred during the transfer. The court noted
that the plaintiff's "condition did not require ... admission as an
emergency measure .... In the absence of an immediate need for
emergency treatment the requirement of a deposit prior to hospital
admission was neither unreasonable nor improper."' 0 5 Thus, the
court did not find that the hospital had no duty to treat the emer-
gency patient. Rather the court determined that the hospital had
not violated its standard of conduct in arranging for transfer. Under
Joyner, if a hospital, measured by what a reasonable hospital in simi-
lar circumstances would do, determines that the emergency patient
will not suffer injury during or because of the transfer, then a trans-
fer is not negligent.
In Jones v. City of New York Hospital for Joint Diseases,' the court
held a hospital liable for not providing emergency surgery to an un-
desirable patient. The patient came to the emergency room after
being assaulted. She was diagnosed as having a stab wound pene-
trating the abdomen. Only private beds were available, and the hos-
pital or intern apparently thought the patient unsuitable for a
private bed. Her wound was simply cleaned and dressed. Although
the hospital had appropriate surgical facilities, she was sent by am-
bulance to the city hospital, a one hour trip. After transfer, she died
in surgery.
In court, the intern testified that he did not regard the patient's
condition to be an emergency. However, he testified in deposition
that there could be serious internal injury from such an abdominal
stab wound. Considering the full evidence, the court said "[we are]
convinced that the interne [sic] adopted the alternative of transfer-
ring the patient to the City Hospital for the convenience of his own
hospital and not because he thought there was no emergency."1 0 7
Further, the court noted that there was ample evidence that the pa-
tient required admission at the hospital regardless of its "conven-
ience." Expert testimony showed that the patient's wound
mandated exploratory surgery, and that considering the time factor
for transport, the "proper" course would have been to keep her at
the defendant hospital. The court held for the patient's estate, con-
cluding that "the deceased was denied necessary treatment at the
Hospital forJoint Diseases and was transferred without her consent
to the City Hospital, and that such transfer was a contributing factor
in her death."'
' 0 8
In Jones, as in Hunt, there was no discussion of the legal princi-
ples guiding the court's decision. The hospital, however, evaluated
105. Id. at 916.
106. 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1954), modified, 286 A.D. 825, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628
(App: Div. 1955).
107. Id. at 781.
108. Id. at 784.
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and undertook the responsibility of treating the patient, although it
was unwilling to perform surgery. The Jones court implicitly found
that the standard of conduct measuring the hospital's duty to treat
the emergency patient was based on the patient's emergency needs,
or what treatment was "necessary,"' 9 basing its finding of a breach
of that duty predominantly on expert testimony showing that the
patient required immediate surgery. 1 0
The latter two cases evaluate the decision to make the transfer
entirely in terms of the patient's medical needs. The common
thread binding these and the other cases above (except Crews) is a
duty of "due" or "reasonable" care imposed on a hospital which
undertakes to treat an emergency. Jones and Joyner, however, ex-
pressly recognized that this duty of reasonable care can extend be-
yond the confines of the emergency room and is not confined to first
aid or stabilization. The decisions also suggest the limits of a hospi-
tal's duty to treat unwanted emergency patients. WhileJoyner holds
that a hospital may transfer an undesirable patient when the patient
requires neither immediate admission nor further treatment as an
emergency measure, Jones holds that when a patient does require
further treatment as an emergency measure, including surgery, a
hospital may be liable for refusing it. According to these decisions,
the immediacy of the need for emergency treatment, measured
against the delay or risks involved in transfer, largely determines the
extent of the hospital's obligations. Obviously the availability of
other institutions willing to accept the transfer would have to be
considered in this determination.
The traditional rule that a party will not be liable for undertak-
ing aid absent increased risk or reliance was largely ignored in
Joyner, Jones, and other decisions above. One recent decision may
have attempted to more directly reconcile the policy of requiring a
continuing duty measured by the reasonableness of the conduct
with the traditional undertaking theory. In Riddle Memorial Hospital
v. Dohan,"'1 the patient came to the emergency room by ambulance,
complaining of chest pain. His private physician met him there,
though the physician was not on the hospitals staff and had no ad-
mitting privileges.' 1 2 The emergency room staff (which included a
physician and a nurse) performed an EKG at the private physician's
request, which confirmed a diagnosis of heart attack. The patient
was then transferred to another hospital, apparently at the private
doctor's request. He died during the transfer. At trial, testimony
109. Id. at 783-84.
110. Id.
111. 504 Pa. 571, 475 A.2d 1314 (1984).
112. Id. at 574, 475 A.2d at 1315. This unusual situation occurred when the
patient apparently left for the nearest hospital rather than wait for the physician at
home.
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showed that no one on the emergency room staff informed the pa-
tient of the risk of transfer, or that proper facilities were available
without transfer. In upholding a jury verdict for the hospital, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the law governing transfer
following initial emergency examination:
In essence, [the Restatement of Torts 2d section 323]
is what the trial judge instructed the jury. If the jury found
that the hospital acted unreasonably in allowing the dece-
dent to be removed from the hospital, and it was foresee-
able that such removal would aggravate or increase the
danger of the existing physical condition, the hospital
would be liable.
313
As did the Crews court, the Riddle court explicitly endorsed the
traditional theory of "undertaking" requiring either an increased
risk of harm or detrimental reliance. However, unlike Crews, it is not
clear what the court interpreted that theory to require under these
facts. Crews found that a hospital undertaking emergency care is not
liable for unreasonable acts when a patient dies of original injuries
unless the unreasonable acts affirmatively aggravate or increase the
risk of those injuries. This interpretation is the crux of the "drown-
ing man" problem in the undertaking law. However, the Riddle
court's emphasis on reasonableness suggests that it approved a
standard of conduct determined largely by the reasonableness of the
conduct, even when the undertaking does not affirmatively increase
or aggravate the harm. Moreover, the Riddle court did what the
Crews court refused to do: it left the ultimate decision on liability to
the jury. Therefore, Riddle is more in line with Fjerstad than Crews.
Thus, after stating the common law of undertaking set out above,
the court cited with approval the following jury instruction:
[E]ven if you find that the attending physician re-
mained in charge of the decedent, [the hospital] neverthe-
less remained responsible for those services or acts which
according to good medical practice it should have per-
formed .... Accordingly, a jury could conclude that the
decedent was not a "patient" of [the hospital], and still find
[the hospital] liable for failing to act reasonably in permit-
ting [the private physician] to remove the decedent."
14
The court further noted that "the sole issue for the jury's con-
sideration was whether the hospital acted reasonably once it had
been determined that the hospital undertook to render services to
the decedent."' 5
113. Id. at 557, 475 A.2d at 1317.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 578, 475 A.2d at 1317.
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The Riddle decision may provide an inconsistent analysis of the
undertaking theory. Riddle nonetheless may be another example of
the type of decision modern litigants can expect-one that attempts
to blend the traditional requirements of the common law with a
modem case by case analysis of liability, and which allows a jury to
be the ultimate arbitrator on that issue. Under a literal interpreta-
tion of the "undertaking" law, the Riddle court could have kept the
decision from the jury, as did Crews," 6 and found for the hospital as
a matter of law. Significantly, the court declined to do so.
Though the decisions above may have expanded the traditional
common-law approach to emergency treatment and transfer deci-
sions, the Arizona Supreme Court recently found a still broader
duty to treat emergencies on an alternative theory. In Thompson v.
Sun City Community Hospital,'17 a thirteen year old child was rushed to
a private hospital emergency room with a full or partial femoral ar-
tery transection. Three physicians consulted and agreed immediate
emergency surgery was required. The patient, however, was instead
deemed "stabilized" or "medically transferable," and was trans-
ferred to the county hospital because the family could not pay. At
the county hospital, the child had the femoral artery repaired.
When he was left with a permanent leg injury, his mother filed suit
against the physicians and the hospital claiming that an inappropri-
ate transfer caused the harm.
The hospital admitted that the transfer was made for financial
reasons only and that it was hospital policy to transfer nonpaying
patients whenever medically allowed. The institution rested its de-
fense on its right to transfer a patient who is determined to be "sta-
bilized.""' In addition, the defense argued that the original injury
would have caused the damage regardless of where the surgery was
done. '1 9
The Arizona Supreme Court returned to its decision in Guerrero
v. Copper Queen Hospital,'20 and reaffirmed an Arizona public policy
requiring a private hospital to initiate emergency care. However, the
Thompson court took Copper Queen one giant step forward. The court
held that not only must a private hospital begin care for all emer-
gency patients, but that these patients may not be transferred for
economic reasons until all "medically indicated" emergency care
has been completed.12" ' As for the issue of causation, the court held
that the plaintiff need only show that the institution may have in-
creased the risk of harm by unreasonably transferring the plaintiff,
116. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
117. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
118. Id. at 600-01, 688 P.2d at 608-09.
119. Id. at 605-07, 688 P.2d at 613-15.
120. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
121. 141 Ariz. at 602, 688 P.2d at 610.
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but not prove that there was a probability that the defendant's con-
duct was in fact a cause of the actual harm. 122 In essence, the court
gave the broadest discretion to the jury in determining the hospi-
tal's liability for failing to continue treatment.
Thompson, like Copper Queen, was based on the court's construc-
tion of an Arizona statute,1 23 therefore courts in other states need
not consider the case as common-law precedent. The case was also
decided under the umbrella of a state reimbursement scheme that
paid for indigent care at private hospitals, 124 a plan that many states
do not have. Thompson, however, expressly addresses the same pub-
lic policy issues that have moved other courts to reject a strict inter-
pretation of the common law of undertaking. While Jones, New
Biloxi, Hunt and other decisions above may have implicitly favored
access to emergency care as a policy matter, the Thompson decision
expressly articulates a public policy approving access to emergency
treatment for all true emergency patients, treatment which includes
all "medically indicated" emergency care. For that matter, while
Thompson may provide future courts with yet another approach to
the emergency transfer issue, on the facts, the decision could have
been reached under the analysis suggested by the common-law deci-
sions above. In Thompson, the court found that the patient required
emergency surgery.1 25  Further, the hospital had clearly "under-
taken" to care for him, thus binding itself to the "standard of rea-
sonable care."1 26 Whether the standard is violated is for a jury to
decide, but the Thompson court cited overwhelming evidence that a
reasonable hospital in the same situation would not have subjected
the child to the delay in surgery.1 27 Given the precedent of Jones,
New Biloxi, Fjerstad and Riddle, the Arizona court, following common-
law principles, could have found the hospital potentially liable. In-
deed, it is likely that courts in other jurisdictions will do so, follow-
ing the lead of these decisions.
122. Id. at 608, 688 P.2d at 616.
123. Id. at 601, 688 P.2d at 609.
124. Id. at 602, 688 P.2d at 610.
125. Id. at 603, 688 P.2d at 611.
126. Id. at 599-600, 688 P.2d at 607-08.
127. Id. at 601, 603-04, 688 P.2d at 609, 611-12. Evidence of negligence which
the Arizona Supreme Court also considered in its analysis was the Joint Commis-
sion on the Accreditation of Hospitals (J.C.A.H.) standards for emergency services,
which state: "[N]o patient [should] arbitrarily [be] transferred if the hospital where
he is initially seen has the means for providing adequate care." JOINT COMMISSION
ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HosPrrALS, MANUAL FOR HosPrrALS 33 (1986). As the
Thompson court found, consideration of a patient's source of payment is "arbitrary"
under theJ.C.A.H. standards. 141 Ariz. at 601-02, 688 P.2d at 609-10. A hospi-
tal's breach of its own standards can clearly be evidence of negligence in court. See
supra notes 30, 31.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years many private and some public hospitals have
assumed a new proprietary persona, a business-like posture that
clashes with the traditional hospital goals of charity and community
service. This conflict may be most acute in the emergency room
where the hospital may further its financial interests by quickly
transferring or discharging undesirable emergency patients. Most
modem courts have avoided the traditional common law giving pri-
vate hospitals an absolute right to choose their patients once they
have provided initial first aid. Instead, courts have often required
hospitals to continue to provide care or to arrange for transfer to
another facility and have allowed juries to determine whether the
conduct is reasonable under the circumstances.
This duty of continuing emergency care is measured principally
by what the reasonable provider would do in similar circumstances
and by the medical needs of the patient. This duty can be dis-
charged by transferring the emergency patient, provided the trans-
fer is reasonable. In the emergency treatment cases that have been
decided thus far, the limits of this standard of reasonableness are
generally based on the immediacy of the patient's emergency needs,
measured against the delay and risk of transfer.
Depending upon the specific factual context, this common-law
precedent may impose substantial obligations on hospitals. For ex-
ample, assume a patient appears in the emergency room with a sev-
ered tendon in the wrist. The patient has no insurance; the surgical
repair will be expensive. If the patient is otherwise healthy, alert,
and ambulatory, and if a public facility is available to repair the sev-
ered tendon in time to prevent damage, it would be presumably rea-
sonable to provide initial emergency care, inform the patient and
the public facility, and transfer. However, assume the same patient
has a severed artery in his wrist. This injury may not only require
expensive repair, but also immediate treatment to save the hand. If
permanent damage would likely occur before another hospital could
repair the artery, the hospital that began initial treatment on an
emergency basis may be obligated to perform the surgery. The pa-
tient could be transferred to a public facility once the danger from
delay in treatment has passed. On the other hand, if there is no
other hospital willing to accept the patient, the hospital may be re-
quired to provide extensive treatment, perhaps even rehabilitation,
to this "emergency patient."
This analysis suggests that it is not necessarily the severity of an
injury nor the risk of death that determines whether a hospital must
treat an emergency. Rather, it is the risk of injury from delay in
treatment, or from the transfer itself. This may mean, among other
things, that hospitals in urban areas, which are closer to charitable
institutions and have access to more sophisticated transfer modali-
142
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ties, have a lesser practical obligation to treat the undesirable emer-
gency than more distant transferring hospitals. It also means that
hospitals that are the sole provider for an area, or that are in areas
where there is no charitable hospital, may have a considerable
obligation.
Perhaps more interesting is the question of what duty hospitals
may owe to victims of a catastrophic injury. Under the analysis
above, an emergency room faced with catastrophic trauma requiring
immediate treatment may be liable for refusing treatment, even if it
means extensive hospitalization. Given the expense of some emer-
gency surgical procedures and post operative intensive care, this
may be a difficult burden for some hospitals to bear. As a hypotheti-
cal, recall the news report that began this article in which an unin-
sured victim of penetrating trauma to the skull arrives at an
emergency room. Although the hospital begins emergency treat-
ment, the extensive injury requires expensive and immediate surgi-
cal intervention. In this situation, if a hospital with neurosurgical
facilities elects to transfer the trauma patient, that hospital may be
liable if the delay or transfer causes death or permanent injury. Fur-
ther, the hospital may be liable if the attempted transfer is to a facil-
ity unable or unwilling to care for the patient.
Hospitals, of course, have a legitimate interest in their financial
security and survival. Arguably, some institutions will incur a sub-
stantial financial burden arising from emergency treatment if courts
continue to enforce the duty of continuing emergency care in the
manner suggested by the case law. It is even conceivable that the
added financial burden of emergency treatment could force closings
of marginal institutions. Alternatively, some hospitals may find it
preferable to simply close emergency rooms and refer emergencies
to other institutions or free standing emergency rooms. A third
possibility is present in the complexities of the common law. Some
courts interpreting the "duty to begin treatment" issue have held
that there is no duty to treat emergencies absent an undertaking.
To avoid that theory, these same courts often found an "undertak-
ing" and imposed a duty of reasonable care based on de minimus
acts by the hospital. Hospitals in these jurisdictions could conceiva-
bly take advantage of a literal reading of the common law and re-
quire deposits or proof of insurance before "undertaking" any
evaluation of the emergency patient.
121
Whether hospitals currently conform to the duty of continuing
emergency treatment suggested by the case law is not clear. The
recent increase in emergency transfers has resulted in significant re-
search and media coverage in which the validity of some emergency
128. Note, however, that these hospitals are still subject to statutory and other
requirements relating to emergency room care. See supra note 41.
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transfer policies has been questioned. As indicated earlier, whether
these questionable policies are the rule or the exception is not clear,
notwithstanding trends toward "industrializing" health care. It may
be difficult to believe that many institutions are cavalierly denying
necessary care to emergency patients, just as it is difficult to believe
that they are knowingly subjecting themselves to a risk of liability
given the current medical malpractice "crisis." On the other hand, it
may be that some hospitals are taking a calculated risk. The paucity
of case law reveals that similar suits were rarely heard by courts in
the past, at least at the appellate level. This may reflect the practical
difficulties of bringing a malpractice suit as much as a scarcity of
negligent emergency transfers. As a practical matter, patients most
likely to be transferred are probably indigents or the working unin-
sured with little knowledge of, or access to, the legal system. Con-
sidering the additional difficulty of proving compensable injury and
causation in the already injured patient, some hospitals may assume
the risk of litigation to be low, and thus, a risk worth taking.
Whether this is true or not, there are signs that the public is
becoming increasingly aware of and concerned about emergency
transfers. In the space of two months in early 1985, the CBS news
show 60 Minutes, the New England Journal of Medicine, and the American
Bar Association Journal devoted significant time and space to the med-
ical and legal problems associated with emergency transfers. This
combination of an increase in public awareness and in the numbers
of emergency transfers may suggest a flood of future litigation if
hospitals are unwilling or unable to modify unreasonable transfer
policies.
In the emergency transfer situation, most courts have appar-
ently imposed a duty of continuing emergency care on the "busi-
ness" of emergency treatment. Clearly, this duty restricts the
autonomy of private institutions and can be expensive. However, in
simplistic terms, either the hospitals or the emergency patients must
bear the burden in these circumstances. The patient's burden in-
volves human suffering and possible loss of life; it is also unforesee-
able; the hospital's burden is financial and can be anticipated. Given
these choices, public policy clearly favors burdening the hospital, as
most common-law decisions reflect. Further, if government inter-
vention is required (e.g., further financing of indigent care or sup-
port for charitable institutions), hospitals, not patients, have the
voice and the audience to effect such changes through the legisla-
tures. In any event, hospitals may have to accept the burden of this
duty as the cost of doing "business" in emergency care.
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